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Into the Frying Pan: 
Standing and Privity under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
and Beyond 
 
Richard A. Epstein* 
 
Introduction 
The Place of Regulation and Antitrust in Telecommunications Law 
The persistent problem of monopoly has brought two different sorts of 
state responses that coexist only uneasily with each other. The first of these 
exemplified by the Sherman Act seeks to prevent monopolization by private 
firms. The second deals with direct regulation of what is often called natural 
monopolies, that is industries characterized by marginal costs below average 
cost, so that a single producer is the cheapest supplier of the relevant service.1 
Occasionally, efforts are made to get the best of both worlds. Just that happened 
February, 1996, the United States Congress passed with great fanfare the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which was designed to “promote competition 
and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services 
for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid 
deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”2 The Supreme Court has 
placed its benediction on the transformative power of the Act,3 and its views 
have been echoed by the lower courts charged with the knotty duty of construing 
                                                 
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; Peter 
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. 
1“If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm 
rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of 
firms in it.” Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation 1 (1999) 
2Preamble to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
3See AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
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its complex provisions.4 Thus viewed from on high, it is easy to postulate some 
deep compatibility between the 1996 Act and the venerable 1890 Sherman 
Antitrust Act, which itself is read as the Magna Carta for competition over 
monopoly.5 The ostensible compatibility between these two regimes becomes 
still more explicit through a savings clause in the Telecommunications Act states 
that nothing in that statute “shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede 
the applicability of any of the antitrust laws.”6  
Unfortunately, this oft-repeated paean to the benefits of competition is 
mischievous hype, whose shallowness is revealed by any detailed examination of 
the key operative provisions of the 1996 Act. These provisions do not, because 
they cannot, introduce any regime of pure competition into telecommunications. 
No statute can displace or evade the central dominant truth about the entire 
business: telecommunications is a network industry whose efficiency depends on 
an integrated system, which allows any customer of any provider to interconnect 
with any other customer of any other provider. That systemwide integration can 
be achieved only in a limited number of ways, none of which resembles a pure 
competitive solution of independent firms making separate quality and pricing 
judgments. At the very least some level of interconnection is required, which as a 
minimum requires some generalized duty to interconnect on the part of all 
carriers, whether incumbents or new entrants.7  
Historically, various systems of regulation have been used to restrain 
monopoly power over the network. One choice is the single provider, Ma Bell, 
where the “system is the solution.” This approach concedes from the get-go that 
telecommunications cannot be molded into a competitive system, and then 
imposes some imperfect system of rate regulation as the quid pro quo for Ma 
                                                 
4See, e.g. Goldwasser v. Ameritech, 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000). 
515 U.S.C. § 2. 
6Section 601(b), Telecommunications Act, codified as 47 U.S.C. § 152 note. 
7See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (General duty of Telecommunications Carriers).  
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Bell’s end-to-end statutory monopoly. The second “solution” came with the 1982 
break-up Ma Bell under the Modified Final Judgment8 with the creation of 
Regional Bell Companies who enjoyed local statutory monopolies and AT &T as 
one a group of potential long distance carriers. Under that regime, rate regulation 
was required for each of the Regional Bells. In addition, the competitive long-
distance market required state oversight and regulation over the interconnection 
agreements with the LECs in order to overcome the holdout position of the LECs. 
The mixed success under the MFJ, coupled with the rise of both cellular 
technology and the Internet, led to the 1996 Telecommunications Act. In 
addition, to the interconnection obligation set out above, the LECs (now 
rechristened incumbent LECs or ILECs) were subject to two additional duties—
to provide unbundled access to key network elements, and to sell at wholesale 
prices those telecommunications services that it provides to its own customers at 
retail.9 To broker these agreements, the FCC and the state regulatory 
commissions were given regulatory authority under sections 251 and 252 of the 
1996 Act.10 Yet regulation cannot be avoided here either, for t these 
interconnection rates can only be established with reference to some appropriate 
rate base, either on historical or forward looking costs. The Supreme Court has 
upheld that rules as falling within the scope of the FCC’s mandate, but took a 
diplomatic pass on the question of whether the forward-looking total long-run 
incremental cost rules are confiscatory under the takings clause.11 
This overpromotion of the ends has powerful legal consequences. At its 
inception, it was commonly thought that battles under the 1996 would take place 
exclusively or largely in the administrative arena. In this regard, the extravagant 
                                                 
8See, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (AT&T II, aff’d 
sub nom. Maryland v United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
947 U.S.C. 251 (c)(3) & (4). 
10T.A. 47 U.S.C. § 251 & 252. As an aside, I think that the regulations, as ratified by the 
Supreme Court, see AT & T., allowed the FCC to take too much power at the expense of the state 
commissions. 
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claims that the Act has introduced a competitive system has injected a new 
player into the system: a spate of private actions against the LECs on an amalgam 
of theories that rest of the combined impact of the Sherman Act and the 1996 Act. 
The three most notable suits in this genre all represent important variations on 
the basic theme. The first of these three suits, Goldwasser v. Ameritech,12 was a 
class action brought against Ameritech by its own customers. The gist of the 
action was that Ameritech used its monopoly power to delay the introduction of 
rival CLECs, which thus reduced the opportunities for Ameritech’s customers to 
realize the competitive gains promised under the 1996 Act. The suit rested both 
on the Sherman Act and the 1996 Act, most specifically the statutory duties 
contained in section 251(b), dealing with interconnections. The second of these 
suits was the Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Verizon Communications,13 a class 
action brought by customers of AT&T, which as a CLEC had worked out section 
251 interconnection agreements with Verizon. Once the agreement was in place, 
and AT&T had been signing up former Verizon customers, AT&T alleged 
specific statutory violations which resulted in a consent decree under which 
Verizon paid $10,000,000 to AT&T and $3,000,000 to the United States. The 
complaint urged that Verizon’s dilatory tactics with AT&T resulted in economic 
loss to the class of AT&T customers. The third is Covad Communications Co. v. 
BellSouth.14 Unlike Goldwasser and Trinko, Covad was brought by a single firm that 
was in fact a customer of BellSouth. Its complaint alleged an amalgam of 
Sherman Act and Telecom violations by which BellSouth was alleged to use its 
monopoly power to block Covad’s entry into the high speed DSL (Digital 
Subscriber Line) market.  
                                                                                                                                                 
11535 U.S. 467, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1666–76 (2002) 
12222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000). 
13294 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002), as amended, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 20020, reversing 123 F. Supp.2d 
738 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
14299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002).  
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There are two different lines of attack that might be advanced in order to 
resist this complaint. The first of these applies to all of these cases indifferently 
and reaches the conclusion, as was done in Goldwasser, that the detailed statutory 
scheme under the 1996 Act imposed an extensive set of obligations to 
interconnect that went above and beyond anything found under the essential 
facilities doctrine in the antitrust law, under which the most that could be asked 
of a current provider is that it not block the entry of a future rival. It is important 
to understand that the case did not argue that there was some kind of implicit 
antitrust immunity under the Telecommunications Act, which would have been 
odd in light of the explicit savings clause. But it did argue that it was not possible 
to transmute ipso facto any alleged breach of statutory duty into an antitrust 
violation. This decision has as much application to direct parties as indirect 
parties, and thus operates independently of any standing and privity rules. I 
shall not deal with it further in this paper, even though I will discuss at some 
length Judge Wood’s treatment of the standing issue in that case.   
As should be clear from the above remarks, the second way to attack the 
claims raised in Goldwasser15 and Trinko.16 but not Covad involves the question of 
whether the individual plaintiffs have standing to maintain their antitrust claims, 
which in at least some cases turns on the further question of whether they are in 
privity with the defendants. In this short paper I wish examine these procedural 
issues in as they apply to the telecommunications, with special reference to 
Goldwasser and Trinko. In order to see how these arguments play out in this 
particular context, it is necessary to give some brief overview of how both of 
these concepts do and should work it in general.  
                                                 
15222 F.3d at 398-399. 
16306 F.3d at 98-101. 
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The General Law of Standing and Privity 
Standing. The idea of standing, it is now generally recognized, has both a 
constitutional and a pragmatic component.17  At the constitutional level it is said 
that individual plaintiffs are entitled to bring actions in federal court only if they 
can show that they have “standing” to proceed. That standing requirement is not 
explicit in the United States Constitution, for the language of Article III, section 2 
only states that the “judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity” 
that fall into the three familiar heads of diversity jurisdiction, federal question 
jurisdiction, and suits involving the United States as a party. The ostensible 
standing limitation is said to derive from the use of the word “case,” a term that 
sensibly excludes advisory opinions which involves a suit with only one party, 
but which does not in my view cover any litigation where the plaintiff wishes to 
gain some legal advantage—money, injunctions, declarations, etc.—that the 
defendant wishes to restrict. The current law seems to require that the plaintiff 
therefore show some form of a pocketbook interest above and beyond that which 
is shared by the general population. In many cases, of course, that claim is 
routinely satisfied, but in an important class of cases where the plaintiff protests 
against some structural injustice—the appointment of a federal bishop in 
Washington D.C., the concealment of the activities of the CIA—a wrong which 
may be suffered by all is said to be one for which no individual is entitled to a 
remedy. In my view, these cases represent a partial repeal of the general 
principle of judicial review that has been a staple of our law since Marbury v. 
Madison18 insofar as it makes it impossible for the Courts to rectify government 
abuses of power.  
                                                 
17For the general law, see, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)(noting that “generalized 
grievances” are not grounds for federal jurisdiction). For a more detailed examination of my 
argument here, see Richard A. Epstein, “Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and 
Equitable Remedies,” 4 Chapman L. Rev. 1 (2001); for a shorter version of the argument see, 
Richard A. Epstein, “Standing in Law & Equity: A Defense of Citizen and Taxpayer Suits,” 6 
Green Bag 2d 17 (2002). 
185 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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In my view, the correct way to think of these cases is as suits in equity, by 
analogy to derivative action where one individual citizen, like one individual 
shareholder, is entitled to bring a suit to enjoin the conduct that is beyond the 
power of the United States. At this point, the only standing limitations that make 
sense are those which are internal to the basic logic of the rule. Just as 
nonshareholders are not in a position to bring derivative actions, so too 
noncitizens are not in a position to bring actions that challenge the distribution of 
power among the different branches of government under the United States 
Constitution. In practice, of course, that limitation is of no consequence at all. It is 
difficult to think of any internal matter of governance for which shareholders or 
citizens would be indifferent, but which outsiders would be prepared to 
challenge. 
From what has just been said, it might appear that I should be strongly 
sympathetic to the view that the class members in both Goldwasser and Trinko 
should have standing to bring claims under both the Sherman and the 
Telecommunications Act. But that only goes to the issue of whether there is 
federal jurisdiction over these cases. It bears no relationship to the question of 
whether the plaintiffs in these cases have standing in the second, or prudential, 
sense. To see how the prudential side of the standing doctrine works, it is best to 
disentangle these cases from the context of federal courts, and to think of them as 
lawsuits that are brought within a unitary legal system such as England, or 
within courts of general jurisdiction in the states. Both of these are cases in which 
the special language of Article III of the United States Constitution have no 
relevance at all, and yet they are cases where the doctrine of standing plays an 
enormously important role. 
In order to see how that doctrine functions it is necessary to understand 
both the uses and the limitations of the equitable standing doctrines that are 
invoked in both shareholder derivative suits and citizen suits. In both these 
cases, an individual shareholder and citizen is entitled to step up precisely because 
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there is no single shareholder or citizen that has a distinctive interest that stands 
out from all the others. The amalgamation of the individual suits under the class 
action works so well because all shareholders and all citizens are in precisely the 
same position when it comes to enjoining acts that are beyond the powers of the 
officers (or directors) of the corporation, or the officers (or legislators) of the state. 
The relief, moreover, is of necessity collective. There is no way to stop the illegal 
action for one person but allow it to go forward for another. When what is 
sought is a public good (or bad) allowing one to sue for the benefit of all makes 
strong structural sense.  
Frequently, however, that assumption of parity across large numbers of 
separate individuals does not hold. Thus in the ordinary tort case, the obvious 
victim is the individual who suffers physical injuries as a result of the 
defendant’s action. For these purposes, it does not matter whether the harm in 
question is the direct result of a trespass, or the indirect result of the creation of 
some dangerous condition. Indeed it hardly matters for these purposes whether 
the alleged harm is too remote to allow any recovery, or whether the cause of 
action fails on the merits for other substantive reasons: the want of proof of 
negligence or intention, the availability of affirmative defenses, such as 
assumption of risk or contributory negligence, or even a simple factual denial of 
some critical allegation in the basic complaint.  No matter which of these 
eventualities comes to pass, the person who remains in the best position to press 
the complaint is the person whose nose has been bloodied or whose car has been 
totaled. 
It would, however, be a grave mischaracterization of the factual record to 
assume that only the direct victim has suffered adverse consequences from the 
action in question. No man is an island onto himself, and each therefore has a full 
range of familial, social and business connections with a wide range of 
individuals whose own opportunities are necessarily constrained by the 
plaintiff’s personal injury or property. Thus it is impossible to develop any 
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coherent theory of proximate causation that leads to the conclusion that the wife 
has not been hurt by the injury or death of her husband, even if she herself is 
unscratched be the actions that maimed or killed him. The same can be said 
about children as well; and so too distant relatives. Likewise, business associates 
may well have to scramble to fill the void brought about by the injury or death of 
one of their key employees. The relevance of these losses does not depend on the 
theory of causation brought to bear on the problem. The harms here are “direct” 
in the sense that there is no deliberate and willful actions of third parties, and no 
natural events that sever causal connection. The harms are eminently 
“foreseeable” in the sense that these causal chains are so commonplace that only 
the social blind could ignore them. In many cases the putative defendant is also 
the “last wrongdoer” under a now discredited theory of proximate causation that 
allows the plaintiff to sue one and only one party—the last wrongdoer—in tort.19 
Even though the Supreme Court couches its standing discussion in proximate 
cause language20, it nonetheless takes some noncausal explanation as to why the 
indirect victims of these harms are not allowed to maintain actions for their 
admitted losses. 
The persuasive reasons behind these social judgments are not tied to the 
vagaries of federal jurisdiction but to the social objectives of any system of tort 
(or as will become clear, statutory) liability. The usual point of tort is not solely to 
supply compensation to injured parties, although that is surely an essential part 
of the mix. It is also to secure deterrence against future repetitions of the 
wrongful actions, and to accomplish both of these objectives at some 
administratively acceptable cost. At this point we must take note of the common 
features when these various harms are arrayed side by side. The greatest harm 
comes to the person who is injured or killed. The derivative harms strike a 
                                                 
19For a defense of the rule, see Thomas Beven, Negligence in Law 45 (3d ed. 1908). For the 
modern tests in physical injury cases, see Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 448, 449. 
20Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–70 (1992) 
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broader class and are smaller in extent and more easily mitigated. In some cases, 
as with the injuries to spouses, that conclusion could easily be contested, which is 
why the American system generally allows both husbands and wives actions for 
the loss of consortium.21 But the English system, where these actions were 
pioneered at common law, now takes bars suits by both husbands and wives.22 
Only a small minority of states children to bring suits for loss of consortium, and 
none to my knowledge extend the action to cover distant relatives, friends and 
the like.23 The clear judgment in these cases is one based not on theories of 
causation, but on the economic law of diminishing returns to further action. The 
one prime suit against the tortfeasor is relatively easy to administer and it 
promises substantial damage awards. The plethora of actions that might be 
brought by family and associates are more numerous in number, are for smaller 
amounts of damages, and vary in their intensity given the ability of these distant 
parties to mitigate the losses in question. In a world of zero-transaction costs we 
might be prepared to allow all these individuals to sue for their losses in the 
name of optimal deterrence. But even that judgment is highly contestable. The 
underlying system is such that the dislocations that produce losses to some 
individuals also produce inadvertent gains to others. Think of the man who is 
lucky enough to marry the widow; or the junior employee who gets the 
opportunity to shine because his boss is no longer able to do the job. These can 
never be taken into account, so that full compensation for all losses results in 
systematic overdeterrence. To avoid these difficulties, the standing doctrine cuts 
off the second and more removed circle of harms which it is inefficient for any 
legal system to remedy. It thus produces a smaller class of tractable law suits that 
do better to minimize the sum of accident, deterrence, and administrative costs in 
                                                 
21Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D.C. 1950). 
22Administration of Justice Act, 30 & 31 Eliz. 2 § 2 (1982) (abolishing all actions for loss of 
consortium). 
23See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. 563 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1977) (case against) and Villareal v. 
Arizona, 774 P.2d 813 (Ariz 1989) (allowing children and parents to bring the action). 
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running the tort system.24 It also necessarily leaves a bad taste in the mouth 
because it means that individuals that do suffer real harms at the hands of the 
defendant do not get any form of direct relief. The price of administrative sanity 
is imperfect internalization of losses through the common law system—a trade 
that in general makes eminently good sense.  
The need for the doctrine of standing has, paradoxically expanded, as the 
legal system seeks to remedy an ever greater class of harms. One illustration will 
have to suffice to make the basic point here. Environmental harms results from 
the spillage of pollution. These will damage the unowned fish that swim in the 
waters, and through them the fisherman who troll those waters, the processors 
who package the fish and the restaurants and supermarkets that wish to sell 
them to consumers in either their cooked or uncooked fashion. None of these 
harms count as causally remote, yet the doctrine of standing is routinely invoked 
to limit the new environmental tort to the fishermen, on the ground that the 
widely dispersed individuals in these other groups can mitigate their losses by 
looking, for example, to multiple sources of supply.25 
Privity. Closely associated with the doctrine of standing is the doctrine of 
privity.26 Here the origin of the term comes from the notion of privity of contract, 
which means, roughly speaking, that the only persons who are allowed to obtain 
benefits or to sustain burdens under a contract are the parties to it. Like the 
standing doctrine of which it is a part, the privity doctrine is designed to cut 
short the circle of individuals who can sue in the event of an ordinary breach of 
contract. Thus in the usual case if Able sells goods to Baker that he plans to use in 
a party, his guests are not allowed to bring suit against Able for nondelivery of 
the goods which leaves them eating cold pizza on a festive occasion. The thought 
here is, as a first approximation, exactly what it is in the standing cases. The 
                                                 
24See, generally, Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970). 
25 See, e.g., Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 S. Supp. 975 (E.D. 1981). 
26 For a general discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law 9–24 (1980). 
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immediate action by the buyer of the goods imposes a strong incentive on the 
seller to perform. The creation of a broad class of actions for all individuals who 
depend on the performance of that contract adds an immense amount of 
complexity to the legal system while supplying relatively little of value by way of 
marginal deterrence in the operation of the system. The fear was expressed by 
Judge Cardozo in a wide range of cases in which he sought to limit the scope of 
voluntary undertakings. His fear was this: “every one making a promise having 
the quality of a contract will be under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the 
promise, but under another duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of 
potential beneficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of one 
relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, 
inescapably hooked together.”27 His most famous rendition of the basic point has 
an eerie application to the suits that are involved in these cases, given his fear, 
expressed in cases of accountant’s liability but applicable here: that of exposing a 
defendant “to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to 
an indeterminate class.”28 
The question then arises whether the principle of privity of contract 
should admit any exceptions analogous to those that are invoked to allow actions 
for loss of consortium. Two exceptions are important here The first of these arises 
with goods which A sells to B, only to be resold to C, who then uses or consumes 
them. The goods in question could be poisons or other dangerous substances, 
from which B suffers no harm as an intermediate conduit, but from which C 
suffers major harm. The earliest case in which C sought to recover (in tort, if it 
matters) from A was Winterbottom v. Wright,29 where the defective repairs of a 
coach resulted in physical injury to its driver who was not in privity with the 
repairman. In his final peroration for denying the action, Chief Baron Alderson 
                                                 
27See Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898-899 (N.Y. 1928).  
28 See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). 
29152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). 
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struck a chord that echoes today in Trinko if the word “antitrust” is substituted 
for “tort”.  “By permitting this action, we should be working this injustice, that 
after the defendant had done everything to the satisfaction of his employer, and 
after all matters between them had been adjusted, and all accounts settled on the 
footing of their contract, we should subject them to being ripped open by this 
action of tort being brought against him.”30 
The implicit economic logic behind Winterbottom is to view the sequential 
arrangements between the various parties as being governed by two contracts. 
On this view if the driver has a grievance against his employer, he can maintain 
his suit for satisfaction. Thereafter the employer can seek indemnity from the 
repairman under his contract. In some cases, these two actions will each allow for 
the recovery of the full level of personal injuries. But sometimes this might not 
prove to be the optimal solution. The driver himself may have been to some 
extent at fault in his behavior; or the two parties could have agreed (as happened 
in nineteenth century England) to participate in some kind of a voluntary 
workers’ compensation system that expanded the scope of coverage by 
eliminating the need to prove that the carriage was defective, while limiting the 
damages that could be recovered therefore. Likewise, on the upstream leg of the 
relationship, the original repairman could have insisted on a complete release in 
advance for damages caused by the coach, after allowing the employer to inspect 
the vehicle to his own satisfaction. In principle, these more precise adjustments of 
risk between the parties should outperform any legal injunction that mandates in 
all cases that the injured party receive full tort damages from the repairman 
regardless of what the network of contracts provided. In this regard, privity of 
contract is closely allied with the principle of freedom of contract. 
The privity doctrine has not, as everyone knows, held the line in product 
liability cases. One disadvantage of the rule is that it always requires two actions 
when sometimes a single action could set matters in order. Another is that the 
                                                 
30Id. at. 405.  
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middleman may prove insolvent, thereby insulating the original seller from suit. 
The upshot was in cases like Thomas v. Winchester,31 that in certain cases where 
defective substances, e.g. poisons, in their original condition caused harm to a 
third party, then that party could sue the original manufacturer, without having 
to first go through the intermediate party who might well be an innocent conduit 
with no knowledge of, nor control over the risks in question.   
Yet even here it is vital to understand the constraint that operates in this 
action. Allowing the injured plaintiff in this case implies that the middle party 
drops out, so that one plaintiff is substituted in for another for the same injuries, 
without any increase in the overall burden of liability associated with the sale. 
Yet this formulation then raises again the freedom of contract issue. If the 
defendant could have procured a limitation or release from liability from 
someone with whom he is in privity, then the same limitation or release should 
be allowed against the remote user. Indeed, once those limitations and releases 
are allowed, then the privity requirement becomes a strictly second order issue. 
The original seller will not rely on the vagaries of the law to protect itself in 
dealings with remote parties. Rather, it will actively seek to place themselves in 
privity with the actual users of the product, so as to impose the needed 
contractual restrictions, including routinely those which prevent third-party 
beneficiary actions.32  The contract between AT&T and Verizon also explicitly 
disclaimed any potential third-party beneficiary liability.33 These moreover 
should not be dismissed as abuses of the legal position: the downstream users 
                                                 
316 N.Y. 396 (1852). 
32See, e.g., Stacy v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 484 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1973).  
33Petition of AT&T Communications of New York, Inc. for Arbitration of an 
Interconnection Agreement with New York Telephone Company, Order Approving 
Interconnection Agreement, Case 96-C-0723, 1997 WL 410707 (N.Y.P.S.C. June 13, 1997), 
modified in other respects, 1998 WL 671222 (N.Y.P.S.C. June 3, 1998); Section 22.3 of the 
agreement, id. at *35, provides:  
“22.3 No Third Party Beneficiaries - Except as may be specifically set forth in this 
Agreement, this Agreement does not provide and shall not be construed to provide third 
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have large control over product use, and in many instances will be better cost 
avoiders than upstream suppliers. In one sense therefore, as the recent shrink 
and clickwrap cases suggest, freedom of contract becomes the issue in cases of 
sale.34 The ostensible exceptions to the privity limitation are thus testaments to 
the importance of freedom of contract in this area. The critical decisions of the 
early 1960s, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.35, and Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)., ushered in the modern product liability 
era precisely because they rejected all efforts by the manufacturer to get into 
privity with its ultimate users in order to limit the scope of liability by contract. 
Just that position is ratified in Restatement 3rd, section 18, which says baldly: 
“Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or other distributors, 
waivers by product purchasers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral 
or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against 
sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to persons.” The issue of 
property damage is left open. 
The interaction between privity and freedom of contract took a very 
different course with respect to financial losses. Recall that the original 
formulation of privity makes it impossible for a third party to sue on a contract 
even when both parties to the agreement have in so many words authorized that 
suit. One reason for that rule paralleled the observation of Chief Baron Alderson 
in Winterbottom. It would be anomalous for a third person to bring suit after the 
two original parties to the contract had decided to modify or rescind their 
original deal to their mutual satisfaction. But this turns out in this context to be 
an incomplete answer, for the original agreement could, if it so chose, condition 
the right of action by the third party on the renegotiation of the original 
agreement. Or in many cases, there might be good and sufficient reasons why the 
                                                                                                                                                 
parties with any remedy, claim, liability, reimbursement, cause of action, or other 
privilege.” 
34 See, e.g. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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parties choose to waive this protection. In any event, the early cases of third 
party beneficiary liability all involve the collection of debts by third parties that 
were originally owing to the promisee.36 The logic of these cases therefore 
follows the exact pattern of the early exceptions to the privity limitation. The 
creation of third party liability may shift the person to whom the promisor owes 
and obligation, but it does not increase the obligation so imposed. The great 
concern in all these cases is that the potential liability of the promisor (or product 
seller) must be funded out of the receipts of sale: that becomes a difficult task 
with an infinite expansion of the scope of liability, which is why consequential 
damages are routinely limited by contract. It is therefore no surprise that the 
common law refuses generally to recognize third party beneficiary actions to 
large classes of “incidental” beneficiaries, given the vast expansion of liability 
that it entails.37 But again the problem boils down to questions of freedom of 
contract: in most standard complex agreements, explicit language is introduced 
to negate the possibility of any third party action in the event of contract breach. 
The privity limitation is imposed by contract to bring potential liabilities in line 
with potential receipts. 
The few judicial efforts to go beyond this result have generally met with 
stiff resistance and ultimate reversal. At point in time, there were some judicial 
stirrings that persons who suffered workplace accidents could bring a tort action 
against the insurer of the workers’ compensation carrier for its negligent 
inspection of the premises.38 But these actions were shut down by statute.39 In 
another development, buyers of individual units sought to bring tort actions for 
                                                                                                                                                 
35 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
36 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). 
37 Restatement (Second) of Contract, § 302. 
38 Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1964). 
39 Ill. Rev. Stat 1969, ch. 48, ¶ 138.5(a). 
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defective construction against the lenders to the project builder.40 But again these 
actions tended to wither way in the face of a general rule that economic damages 
are not subject to the basic product liability rules.41   
 
Standing and Privity in the Regulatory State 
The principles of standing and privity carry over to the modern apparatus 
of the regulatory state, both generally and in connection with the antitrust laws. 
At this point we switch from a vaguely contractual to a highly regulatory regime, 
so that the implicit movement toward freedom of contract noted above, does not 
carry over. But even within this regulatory framework one point does remain 
true. The systems of direct regulation and private rights of action cannot get 
blood from a stone: the regulated parties are restricted in the revenues that they 
can collect. There must be parallel adjustments in the charges that can be 
imposed if the system is to be kept in equilibrium. That point takes on added 
urgency because all telecommunications companies are sitting ducks for antitrust 
actions since it is easy to allege that their (albeit diminished) statutory powers 
confers on them the kind of monopoly power that the Sherman Act is meant to 
counteract, notwithstanding the statutory duties of interconnection, unbundling 
and resale. In light of the context, the limitations on standing and privity should 
be reflected in the regulatory arena and, as a general matter they are. I shall first 
review the general modern law on standing and privity and then apply that 
analysis to the telecommunications context. 
General Law of Standing. The leading general decision on the modern law 
of standing and privity is Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,42 which 
refused to allow a customer of a broker-dealer to sue the defendant for a fraud 
                                                 
40 Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assn, 447 P.2d 609 )Cal. 1968), limited by statute: 
Calif. Civil Code. § 3434. 
41See, e.g., Case Clara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 1244 
(Fla. 1993). 
42 503 U.S. 258 (1992).  
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committed on that broker-dealer. The decision incorporated by common law 
analogies a standing requirement into RICO actions, even though the basic 
statutory provision did not use the term, but in so many words covered “any 
person injured in his business or property.”43 The case made explicit reliance on 
the antitrust precedents under Section 15 of the Clayton Act,44 which served as a 
model for RICO. In this case, as well as others, the standing requirement was 
unfortunately conflated with the rules of proximate causation, even though, as 
noted earlier, the standing requirement develops precisely because the rules of 
proximate causation are not restrictive enough with respect to indirect harms.45  
All this said, the “policy justifications” behind the Supreme Court’s 
standing rules are not dependent on any proximate causation arguments, and 
these track perfectly the generalized arguments for the prudential standing 
requirement set out above. The first of these factors note that as other events 
intervene it becomes ever more difficult to determine the extent of loss that is 
attributable to the actions of the defendant. Knocking out remote parties from 
liability has, of course, the same effect that the privity limitation does in products 
liability cases. It places the risk of loss on the parties who are in possession of the 
relevant goods or in control of the relevant situation. The second concern noted 
in Holmes related to the need to avoid complex rules for apportioning losses 
among the multiple parties who form links in the causal chain. The last of 
Holmes’s relevant considerations is that suits brought by remote victims were 
                                                 
43 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The complete section reads: “Any person injured in his business or 
property by reason of a violation of section 1362 of this chapter may sue therefore in any 
appropriate United States district court. . . .” 
44 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267-272. As we said, however, in Associated General Contractors {v. 
California State Council of Carpenters]459 U.S. 519 [(1983)], quoting Justice Holmes, “‘The general 
tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.’” 459 U.S. at 
534 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533, (1918)), and 
the reasons that supported conforming Clayton Act causation to the general tendency apply just 
as readily to the present facts, underscoring the obvious congressional adoption of the Clayton 
Act direct-injury limitation among the requirements of § 1964(c).” 
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unnecessary when the needed incentive effects could be supplied by the parties 
who were subject to immediate injury.  
Antitrust. Standing Similar issues have had been important under the 
general antitrust laws. The most obvious application of standing and privity 
rules in antitrust is the well-known doctrine of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.46 
Section 15 of the Clayton Act reads: 
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust law may sue therefore in any 
district court of the United States . . . .” 
On its face that provision does not distinguish between direct and indirect 
victims of the defendant’s wrong, for both types of parties are indeed “injured” if 
the only question at hand are the tests of proximate cause discussed above. 
Nonetheless in Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court drew the distinction between 
direct and indirect purchasers that is found nowhere on the face of the statute, in 
parallel with the background principles of standing that have developed in tort 
and contract actions at common law. The upshot was that in a horizontal price 
fixing case, only the direct purchaser from the wrongful defendant has standing 
under the antitrust laws, to the exclusion of its own customers who have suffered 
from indirect harm.  
In many of these cases, of course, the immediate buyer will be able to pass 
some or all of its overcharges on to its purchasers, some of whom may well be 
able to pass these overcharges further down the line. In an ideal administrative 
world, each of these persons should be able to sue for the full extent of its loss. 
But under Illinois Brick, two complementary deviations are made from this 
implicit norm. The first permits the immediate buyer to recover for the full 
amount of the overcharge, with no set offs allowed for any money it recouped on 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 See, Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-269. See also, the Second Circuit decision Laborers Local 17 
Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. 191 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1999), paraphrasing, and 
which contains the subheading: “Proximate Cause as an Element of Standing Under RICO.”  
46 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
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resale to its buyers.47 The second invokes the privity limitation to bar the remote 
purchaser from maintaining any action at all against the Sherman Act 
wrongdoer, even though he may have a remedy under contract against his 
immediate seller. These dual adjustments cancel each other out insofar as the 
price-fixer bears the full extent of the overcharge either way. The combined effect 
of these rules preserves the deterrent effect while simplifying the administrative 
costs of running the legal process. It follows therefore the common law rules of 
standing to a “T” and makes adjustments in the measure of recovery in order to 
get closer to optimal deterrence. 
The Telecommunications Trinity. The question then is how this interplay of 
these two provisions play out in connection with the actions brought in 
Goldwasser, Trinko, and Covad. For these purposes, we can quickly put Covad to 
one side because it involves a direct action by Covad against BellSouth for 
wrongs that arise out of their relationship.48 That said, it is best to consider Trinko 
first because it involves a suit by the actual customers of a CLEC against the 
ILEC. Once that situation is understood, we can then turn to the second variation 
in Goldwasser, which involves a suit by direct customers of the ILEC who are 
potential customers of the CLEC. 
Trinko. The key statutory provision of the Telecommunications Act is 
Section 206 which provides that any common carrier who commits a wrong 
“shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby,”49 The analogous 
                                                 
47  Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) 
48 Briefly, however, I should add that I think that the case is profoundly misguided in that the 
regulatory scheme alone should govern these disputes. It is quite inconceivable how a ILEC 
could bargain with a CLEC if any opposition within the administrative arena sets up an antitrust 
action. It is in cases like this that myth of a competitive telecommunications market upsets the 
proper judgment on the interaction between antitrust and regulatory rules. The antitrust rules 
should be sharply limited, as to cases where rival CLECs enter into combinations with each 
other. 
49 The full section reads:  
In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or permit to be done, any act, matter, or 
thing in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, 
matter, or thing in this chapter required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable 
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provision of Section 207 in turn provides that “[a]ny person claiming to be 
damaged by any common carrier” may bring suit.”50 The general phrases in both 
statutes parallel those found in the Clayton Act and RICO. Nonetheless Judge 
Katzmann refused to import any distinctive standing requirement into the 
section, reasoning as follows: 
Bell Atlantic contends that the plaintiff cannot bring suit because its 
injury is wholly derivative of the injury suffered by AT&T. In the RICO 
context, it is well-established that a plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of its injury in order to 
have standing to bring a RICO action. See Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-70, (1992); Laborers Local 17 Health and 
Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1999). We 
have noted that “to plead a direct injury is a key element for 
establishing proximate causation. ...” Laborers Local, 191 F.3d at 235. But 
we have not held that sections 206 and 207 of the Communications Act 
contain a requirement of proximate cause. We need not resolve the 
difficult issue of whether there is such a requirement, however, because 
on this record the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that it suffered a direct 
injury. In discussing the question of antitrust standing, the district court 
found that “the harm that these customers are alleging—damages 
resulting from poorer service than they would otherwise have received 
had Bell Atlantic acted lawfully—is wholly distinct from the harm 
suffered by the competitors.” Trinko, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 741. The plaintiff 
alleges that it suffered a direct harm, poor phone service, as a result of 
the defendant’s misconduct. While the district court may find otherwise 
after discovery and a motion for summary judgment, it is too early to 
                                                                                                                                                 
to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in 
consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this chapter, together with a 
reasonable counsel or attorney’s fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, 
which attorney’s fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case. 
 47 U.S.C. § 206. 
50The full section reads: 
Any person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of 
this chapter may either make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or 
may bring suit for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be 
liable under the provisions of this chapter, in any district court of the United States of 
competent jurisdiction; but such person shall not have the right to pursue both such 
remedies. 
 47 U.S.C. ß 207.  
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conclude on this record that the plaintiff only suffered a wholly 
derivative injury.51 
This analysis misses the boat on all counts. Although Katzmann’s opinion 
makes passing reference to the key decisions in Holmes and Laborers Local 17, it 
honors them in the breach and not in the observance. Those cases did not allow 
the plaintiff to escape the prudential standing requirement by the simple 
expedient of pleading that the harms in question were direct. It required a clear 
showing of that directness in light of the factors outlined in Holmes. In this case, 
the chain of causation implicit in the plaintiff’s allegation was that Bell Atlantic 
had engaged in wrongful conduct toward AT&T, which compromised the 
quality of the service that was in turn received by the members of the Trinko 
class. The three relevant considerations introduced in Holmes thus block the 
action. Ignoring for the moment the class action elements in this case, it is clear 
that any degradation in telephone surface that Trinko suffered could be 
attributable to a minimum of three separate parties: his own defective internal 
law office system, the mistakes that were made by ATT, or the improper tactics 
of Bell Atlantic. It is unclear whether other parties were involved in the provision 
of that phone service, although such is surely likely given the interactive 
behavior of multiple parties who use the common network. Surely this counts as 
a case in which the injection of independent forces makes it difficult to ascertain 
the extent of the defendant’s behavior. The issue is only compounded for the 
class action since each individual subscriber could make its own distinctive 
contribution to the harm: nor is it clear that the interaction between ATT and Bell 
Atlantic is uniform across their entire business relationships. It goes without 
saying that the apportionment of causation required in this new regime will raise 
the fearsome complications that led the Holmes court to invoke the standing 
doctrine. And finally, ATT, which in fact pursued its remedies against Bell 
Atlantic counts as exactly that sort of savvy intermediary who in asserting its 
                                                 
51 Trinko, 306 F.3d at 100. (footnotes omitted). 
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own rights against Bell Atlantic will provide protection for its own customers. 
Nothing here prevents Trinko from suing ATT if it so chooses, although in all 
likelihood it will be barred by contractual limitations against consequential 
damages. In the unlikely chance that such protection was not included, it is an 
open question whether ATT should be able to defend itself in that action by 
alleging the deficient service of Bell Atlantic. But for these purposes, the decision 
on that point does not matter. If the defense is disallowed, then ATT should be 
entitled to more substantial recovery against Bell Atlantic than would otherwise 
be the case.  
Nor is it persuasive in this context to note that Sections 206 and 207 do not 
contain any explicit mention of the standing requirement. Such is true with 
respect to both the Clayton Act and RICO as well. Both of those statutes 
imported for good and sufficient reasons the common standing requirement into 
their jurisprudence, and the same should be done here as well. Judge Katzmann 
noted in passing that no one could find any case of suits by indirect purchasers 
under the Communications Act before the passage of the 1996 Act, but he 
thought the matter was of little importance: 
To support its argument for dismissal, the defendant points to the 
absence of published cases involving actions by indirect purchasers 
allegedly injured by railroad rates that were regulated by the now 
repealed Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”). Because “sections 206 and 
207 of the Communications Act were expressly modeled on the 
enforcement provisions of the ICA,” this Court has “held that decisions 
construing the ICA are persuasive in establishing the meaning of the 
Communications Act. ...” Conboy, 241 F.3d at 250; see also  AT&T Corp. v. 
Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, (1998); H.R. Rep. No. 73-1850, at 6 
(1934).  
Although we have found no indirect purchaser case brought under 
the ICA, the defendant does not point to any authority barring such a 
suit. In light of the unambiguous language of sections 206 and 207, the 
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absence of such a case is insufficient to establish that such an action is 
not permitted.52 
On the narrow point, this decision is right only in the most disingenuous 
and hyper technical sense, for the question of whether overcharges within a 
regulatory system raises parallel issues to those of Illinois Brick. Does the carrier 
who is able to pass these overcharges on to customers have the right to recover 
them from the railroad. That issue was raised in Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-
Taenzer Lumber Co.,53 which was relied on explicitly by the Supreme Court in 
both regulatory and antitrust contexts, and which was quoted with approval in 
Holmes.54 In Southern Pacific, the precise question before the Supreme Court was 
whether an immediate customer could recover the full amount of the overcharge 
under the Interstate Commerce Act. In a literal sense, it is possible for Judge 
Katzmann to say that “we have found no indirect purchaser case.” But in a 
functional sense, it is clear beyond a shadow of the doubt that Justice Holmes 
would have denied that action if it had been brought. Here is what he had to say: 
[The indirect purchaser] has no privity with the carrier. The 
carrier ought not to be allowed to retain his illegal profit, and the only 
one who can take it from him is the one that alone was in relation with 
him, and from whom the carrier took the sum. Behind the technical 
mode of statement is the consideration well emphasized by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, of the endlessness and futility of 
the effort to follow every transaction to its ultimate result. Probably in 
the end the public pays the damages in most cases of compensated 
torts.55 
Holmes’s import is easy to collect by looking at the precedents he cites. 
For example, State v. Central Vermont Ry.56 did involve an indirect purchaser who 
was promptly bounced on privity grounds under a statute whose operative 
provision allowed the “party aggrieved” by an overcharge to obtain recovery 
                                                 
52 Trinko, at 100. 
53245 U.S. 531 (1918). 
54See Holmes, as quoted, note 44, supra. 
55Id. at 534. 
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from the carrier. Nonetheless, the Court was emphatic that the common law 
rules carried over to the situation. I quote the passage in full so that there can be 
no mistake of its meaning. 
The question here is regarding the right to sue. The right to 
recover an overcharge is given to the party aggrieved. The party 
aggrieved, in the natural sense, is one from whom the overcharge is 
demanded and collected. Does the fact that this person refrains from 
asserting his remedy, and recoups himself by an adjustment of prices 
based on the charges exacted, make each one of his purchasers a party 
aggrieved within the meaning of the statute? The parties thus 
aggrieved have no relations with the railroad company, and suffer but 
indirectly from the action of the company through the ordinary 
operation of the laws of trade. This plaintiff is injuriously affected as 
every member of the community is injuriously affected who purchases 
an article of merchandise at an increased price because of the payment 
by the dealer of an excess of freight charges. If such a payment of 
freight charges in the form of purchase price entitles the payor to 
recover from the railroad company, different persons, affected by the 
action of the company in different ways, are entitled to sue it for the 
same money. It can hardly be denied that a provision for the recovery 
of an overpayment points to the parties in whose dealings the 
overpayment was made, and to the payor therein as the party 
aggrieved. The loss of the plaintiff flows directly from the action of its 
vendor, and only indirectly from the defendant’s overcharge. It may be 
substantially injured, but it cannot be brought within the remedy 
without holding that the right to sue follows the transfer of the 
property wherever it may be sold with the freight charges transformed 
into purchase price. A statute is not to be given a construction at 
variance with established rules of procedure unless the intention of the 
Legislature is apparent.57 
There is then a pretty solid line of cases that addresses the precise 
question on which Judge Katzmann could not find any relevant authority. The 
solution that it imposes anticipates that reached in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe. 
The remote action is barred, and the immediate purchaser is able to recover the 
overcharge that is passed on. The blithe way in which Trinko ignores Holmes and 
                                                                                                                                                 
5671 A. 193 (Vt. 1908) 
57Id. at 194. 
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the earlier case law illustrates one hidden pitfall to any large-scale program of 
statutory reform. The 1996 Telecommunications Act did not alter one word of 
either section 206 and 207, so that one should have thought the provisions had 
the same meaning before and after those reforms, in light of established case law. 
But instead the “unambiguous meaning” of a section is allowed to triumph over 
the uniform interpretation of this provision and every analogous common law 
and statutory exemplar dealing with a parallel problem.  
In this regard, moreover, it hardly matters that this case differs in small 
detail from Illinois Brick (or Southern Pacific) in that the consequential damages 
here were independent losses and not simply a pass through of some general 
overcharge. The claims for indirect losses by the health insurers of smokers in 
Laborers Local 17, did not involve any pass through losses either. Yet nothing 
there prevented the application of the general Holmes analysis, which should 
govern to the extent that Trinko is found to lie outside the scope of Illinois Brick. It 
would, for example, be utterly inconsistent with the spirit of these cases to 
assume that the remote purchaser would be able to maintain an action if its 
losses were greater than that of the immediate purchaser. Thus suppose that the 
indirect purchaser paid a percentage mark-up to the immediate purchaser, such 
that a sum in excess of the overcharge was paid by the remote purchaser. It is not 
credible to think that he could maintain an action for the undefined amount of 
that excess. The privity rule was categorical and its desired effect on 
simplification would be gutted if the rule of Illinois Brick or Southern Pacific were 
read is so limited a fashion.  
Trinko then is manifestly wrong in its treatment of the standing and 
privity issue. The analysis is far more difficult in dealing with the potential 
customers of the ILECs that preoccupied Judge Wood in her much more 
thoughtful analysis in Goldwasser, which proceeds as follows: 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the question whether 
the Goldwasser plaintiffs had standing under the antitrust laws to 
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bring their suit. We conclude that the answer is yes, no matter which 
branch of antitrust standing doctrine one considers. First, as we noted 
above, the plaintiffs were direct purchasers from Ameritech, and their 
complaint asserts that a variety of practices in which Ameritech has 
engaged and is engaging in have led prices for those services to be 
anticompetitively high, in violation of Section 2. As direct purchasers, 
they have no Illinois Brick problem. As people forced to pay an alleged 
monopolistic overcharge, they have described the kind of injury the 
antitrust laws are designed to redress, which is to say they have 
satisfied the “antitrust injury” requirement of Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, (1977). They are consumers, not 
shareholders, or unions, or others whose injury is too remote to satisfy 
Clayton Act § 4; thus, they have standing. . . as the term is defined in 
Associated General Contractors,[ v. California State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 539-41 (1983) (general definition of “person injured” 
within the meaning of Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C § 15)58. 
I have no question that this decision is correct insofar as it contends that 
the plaintiffs in Goldwasser are direct purchasers as that term is used in Illinois 
Brick. But if for that reason Illinois Brick does not apply, then Judge Wood should 
refer to Holmes to resolve the more generalized standing question. In order to see 
how Holmes plays out in the current context, it is critical to look at the substantive 
allegations raised against Ameritech, which in this passage were elided to refer 
to those activities “in which Ameritech has engaged and is engaging in have led 
prices for those services to be anticompetitively high, in violation of Section 2.” 
But that version eliminates all reference to the competitors of Ameritech that 
Judge Wood noted were critical to the twenty basic allegations in Goldwasser’s 
complaint. These followed the basic pattern claiming that Ameritech has not 
provided to its competitors certain services that it is obligated to do under the 
1996 Telecommunications Act.59 Two examples illustrate the basic theme: 
(1) Ameritech is not providing the same quality of service to its competitors 
as it provides to itself, in violation of § 251. 
                                                 
 58 Id.  
59Goldwasser at 222 F.3d at 394-95. 
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(2) Again in violation of § 251, Ameritech has not given its competitors 
nondiscriminatory access to its operational support systems, nor has it given 
them access to unbundled elements of its system on terms equivalent to those 
Ameritech enjoys.60 
At this point it is critical to note that the chain of causation differs from 
that found in the ordinary case of price fixing overcharges to the immediate 
purchaser. Rather in the litany of charges raised in Goldwasser, the plaintiffs chief 
objection is that they have suffered as potential customers of some unidentified 
CLEC rival. Any charge that Ameritech simply used its statutory monopoly to 
charge too much money is defeated by the “filed rate” doctrine, which holds that 
rates approved by a regulator cannot be challenged in a damage action under the 
antitrust law.61 The reason that this doctrine does not apply here is because the 
complaint alleges multiple harms that Ameritech’s illegal practices have done to 
its competitors, in consequence of which their telecommunications options were 
circumscribed.  
At this point, the case bears scant resemblance to the kinds of proof that 
are needed to make out the claim of causation and direct loss under Illinois Brick. 
Indeed in this case it is not clear that the direct customers of Ameritech have 
suffered at all from any of the alleged misconduct toward rival suppliers. To be 
sure, if each and every member of the class would have switched away from 
Ameritech if it had behaved properly towards ILECs, as the plaintiffs see it 
toward the nameless competitors, then one could posit a loss to them. That loss is 
not simply a result of the passing down of the overcharge to a direct customer, 
which was the situation in Illinois Brick. But by the same token, a competitive 
telephone market allows more than one firm to keep market share. Some 
unknown subgroup of Ameritech’s customers would in all likelihood have 
                                                 
60 Id. at 394. 
61 Id. at 402. The filed rate doctrine “bars courts from re-examining the reasonableness of 
rates that have been filed with regulatory commissions.” See Keogh v. Chicago, Northwestern Ry. 
Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163-164 (1922), noting that the rate hearing does not protect the parties from 
criminal proceedings, injunction, or forfeiture. Id. at 162–63. 
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decided to stay with Ameritech, in which case they could well have benefited 
from any effort that Ameritech might have made to overload the costs of running 
the network on its incipient competitors. At this point, the ostensible unity of this 
class of plaintiffs breaks down. It therefore becomes apparent that the proper 
party to press claims against Ameritech for its alleged misconduct is some 
unnamed CLEC who is the direct victim of these specified wrongs. Its losses, if 
any, need not be reduced by any recoupment that it might receive from its 
customer base, present or future.  
At this point, it becomes critical to stress yet again that the standing 
requirement, rightly understood, is not a part of any general test of proximate 
causation. Rather it is designed to make sure that the single defendant who is in 
the best position to press claims occupies the field to the exclusion of others. The 
direct relationship between Ameritech and its customers is not the source of this 
grievance. Their actions are multiple and disparate. What matters is how 
Ameritech treated its CLECs. A single cause of action based on contract, breach 
of regulatory duty, and, perhaps, even the antitrust laws displaces the massive 
proliferation involved in this case. The point here is important because if the 
general standing requirements of Holmes apply, then the precise legal theory 
becomes irrelevant to the case. No matter what kind of theory is pursued, 
Ameritech’s own customers would not be the right plaintiffs in any action 
alleging the loss of potential advantage from contracting with CLECs even if the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 were repealed tomorrow. So long as the harm to 
these customers comes through the actions that Ameritech engaged in 
relationship to its prospective competitors, then it has standing and the customer 
base does not. 
Judge Wood also insists that the plaintiffs are not blocked from suit by the 
doctrine of ius tertii. Again her words are worth quoting in full:  
Finally, we think Ameritech is wrong to claim that the plaintiffs lack 
standing because they are attempting to raise third-party rights--the rights 
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of the competitors. It is true that the reason the plaintiffs have been 
injured (allegedly, of course) implicates the rights of the competitors not 
to be excluded from the local markets through anticompetitive actions of 
Ameritech, but that does not make this a jus tertii case. These plaintiffs 
want lower prices and more choice, and they claim that Ameritech (a 
monopolist) is doing things to prevent that from happening. Their theory 
is a classic exclusionary acts theory, and in all such cases, the monopolist’s 
alleged sin is the exclusion of other competitors from the market. One 
assumes that those other competitors are grateful for the help from the 
consumer litigation, but that is incidental. The Goldwasser plaintiffs do 
not care in principle which competitors enter their markets; they just want 
a competitively structured local telephone market that will prevent 
Ameritech from inflicting antitrust injury on them. We are satisfied that 
they are asserting their own rights, and thus that they have standing.62 
This argument is correct in my view insofar as it holds that the doctrine of 
ius tertii is not part of this case. But the objection to the plaintiff’s standing does 
not rest on that ground. Rather, the argument is that the plaintiff does not have 
standing under the general rules of the subject even if the injuries to it are 
distinctive from those of the CLECs. In the generalized discussion of standing 
above, claims for loss of business profits through the death or injury of a key 
employee are not efforts to recover a second time the losses that were sustained 
to the employee. They were efforts to vindicate the separate relational interest that 
the plaintiffs had on their own account. The standing requirement snuffed these 
actions out because of the importance of channeling legal activity into the 
individual or small group of individuals who could vindicate the policies of the 
law at the lowest administrative cost. No one doubts that some customers may 
have been hurt (just as some may have been helped) by Ameritech’s policies. But 
the overall analysis remains the same. What is critical is not the direct 
relationship that the plaintiffs have with Ameritech. Rather what matters is the 
causal path set out in the complaint which runs straight through third parties 
who themselves have direct rights of action Ameritech. 
Conclusion 
                                                 
62 Id. at 398-399. 
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The doctrines of standing and privity have a long and rich history as part 
of the common law and as part of multiple statutory schemes. These background 
understandings were always part of the antitrust and telecommunications law 
before the adoption of the 1996 Act and they remain part of that understanding 
afterwards. The key to understanding the Act begins with a fundamental 
appreciation of its basic mode of operation. The statute did not usher in the age 
of competitive markets in telecommunications. It substituted one scheme of 
regulation for the one that proceeded it. That system is one that tightly limits the 
charges that incumbents can make for various kinds of interconnection, and 
subjects them to a variety of administrative limitations that curb their ability to 
garner in monopoly profits while exposing them to serious risks of confiscation 
through regulation. The potential liabilities that are imposed on the ILECs for the 
discharge of their duties must come from their future revenue streams if they are 
to remain in business. That simple truth has long led courts and legislatures in a 
wide range of contexts to limit both the number of potential plaintiffs and the 
damages that these can recover. The first of these objectives is achieved by a 
combination of standing and privity rules that are designed to identify a subclass 
of harmed individuals who are entitled to maintain legal actions against the 
ILECs for breach of their statutory duty. Yet somehow in the confused 
interaction between the Sherman Act and the 1996 Communications Act that 
fundamental constraint has disappeared from view. The old fear of Judge 
Cardozo was that no industry could survive the prospect of indeterminate 
liability to an indeterminate class. That lesson seems to have been lost today.  
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